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Consider the following scenario: 
 
 
Alternative. There is a linguistic community speaking a language much like English, except for the 
following differences (and whatever differences are directly entailed). While their words ‘good’, 
‘right’ and ‘ought’ have the same evaluative and normative roles as our words ‘good’, ‘right’ and 
‘ought’ have, their words aren’t coextensive with our ‘good’, ‘right’ and ‘ought’. So even if they 
are exactly right about what is ‘good’ and ‘right’ and what ‘ought’ to be done, in their sense, and 
they seek to promote and to do what is ‘good’ and ‘right’ and what ‘ought’ to be done in their 
sense, they do not seek to promote what is good and right and what ought to be done. 
 
Sometimes one distinguishes between moral terms and all-things considered normative terms, by appeal to 
the seeming non-triviality of worries like: I know that I morally ought to ⎞, but ought I really to ⎞? 
Given such a distinction, what I am talking about here are the all-things-considered terms rather than 
the moral terms. Using the fashionable terminology of ‘thin’ and ‘thick’: the terms should be 
understood in the thinnest possible way.1 
Is a community like this possible? That is, are alternative normative terms like these 
possible? I will approach the question indirectly. In the next two sections, I will make the following 
points. First, if Alternative is in fact impossible then an important class of popular and attractive 
metaethical theories, or, more specifically, theories of the semantics of evaluative and normative 
terms – theories I will call Alternative-friendly – are false.2 Among the Alternative-friendly theories are 
theories central to popular contemporary versions of naturalistic normative realism. Second, if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* I have presented this or closely related material at Brandeis, MIT, SUNY-Albany, and Boston University, and 
also at the Value Concepts workshop at the University of Leeds, 2010. Thanks to all these audiences for helpful 
feedback. Thanks also to David Liebesman, Eric Rowe and Giulia Pravato for helpful discussion. 
1 The words considered are of course context-sensitive. I will be focusing on a particular class of uses of these 
words. 
2 I will keep talking of “semantics” even where properly I should occasionally rather speak of metasemantics, since 
I will speak of theories of how semantic features are determined rather than theories of what the semantic 
features are. 
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Alternative is in fact possible then, as we will see, a number of novel thorny problems about normative 
realism and knowledge of the normative can be raised, and we face an uncomfortable choice between 
different things to say. The Alternative-friendly theorist must either accept that there are ineffable 
questions or else accept that the importance of normative questions is deflated. 
These points put together serve to raise a dilemma for Alternative-friendly theories. If 
Alternative is impossible, such theories are false; if Alternative is possible, friends of such theories 
face the uncomfortable choice alluded to. The rest of the paper will then be devoted to clarifications 
and responses to various possible objections to this argument. 
The kind of problem I will discuss is structurally similar to the Moral Twin Earth argument 
presented by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in various writings (see e.g. their 1992 and 2009), 
as well as to considerations prominently brought up by R. M. Hare. Later, in section 4, I will 
explicitly compare Horgan and Timmons’ argument as well as Hare’s considerations, and note the 
ways in which the challenge that I present differs. 
 
1. What if Alternative is impossible? 
Consider the possibility that Alternative is impossible. The reason it would be so is that what our 
(thinnest) normative words are true of is so intimately bound up with their normative roles that there 
is no way that words with the same normative role could fail to be coextensive. One can attempt to 
back this up by appeal to intuition pumps of a kind common in the literature, for example the Moral 
Twin Earth scenarios that Horgan and Timmons consider: when we imagine a situation of the kind 
described in Alternative our reaction is that we and the members of the alternative community mean 
the same thing by ‘good’, ‘right’ and ‘ought’. However, several different kinds of theories of the 
semantics of normative terms demand that Alternative is possible. As I will put it, they are Alternative- 
friendly. These theories are all false if Alternative is impossible. 
Take first causal normative semantics of the kind associated with so-called Cornell moral 
realism: normative predicates, like descriptive natural kind predicates, have their reference 
determined by what their use is appropriately causally linked to.3  Causal links are a different matter 
from normative role, and it would appear that terms can be causally linked to different properties 
even while they have the same normative role. Two communities could use predicates with the same 
normative role, even while tokenings of the two predicates stand in relevant causal relations to 
different things. Even if the normative role can help explain what the use of the predicate is 
appropriately causally linked to, the causal link is not a function of normative role alone, and that is 
sufficient for Alternative to be possible. Causal normative semantics is Alternative-friendly. In his 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This idea is most prominent in Boyd (1988) and Brink (1989). 
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(1988), one of the main Cornell realists, Richard Boyd, considers an issue related to the one we are 
bringing up here: 
 
The moral realist—in the guise of the homeostatic consequentialist [the specific view Boyd 
assumes in the paper], say—holds that what regulate the use of moral terms are facts about 
human well-being. But this is simply not so. Consider, for example, sixteenth-century discussions 
of rights. One widely acknowledged ‘right’ was the divine right of kings. Something surely 
regulated the use of the language of rights in the sixteenth century, but it clearly wasn’t human 
well-being construed in the way the moral realist intends. Instead, it was the well-being of kings 
and the aristocratic class of which they were part.4 
 
Boyd’s reply to the objection is essentially to say that although the belief in the divine rights of kings 
was widespread, the use of moral terms was anyway, at bottom, causally regulated by facts about 
human well-being generally.5 This amounts to a piece of – perhaps reasonable – empirical 
speculation. But even if Boyd’s speculation is correct, there is still a question of whether something 
like what is alleged in the objection is possible; more specifically, whether causal normative semantics 
is Alternative-friendly. Boyd does not even attempt to provide a reason to think it is not. 
The Cornell realists tend to discuss specifically moral terms. When I present the theory of 
how reference is determined as concerning normative terms more broadly, a step is taken. One could 
in principle adopt the proposed theory when it comes to the reference of the moral ‘right’, while – if 
one acknowledges a separate ‘all things considered’ use – rejecting the theory as a theory of the all 
things considered ‘right’. I will slide over such details. Similar remarks will apply to other theories I bring 
up in this section.6 
Second, compare neo-descriptivist normative semantics such as that defended in Frank 
Jackson’s (1998). On this view, the reference of moral terms is determined by folk morality, our folk 
theory of matters moral. Take all moral, or generally normative, beliefs among the folk that are 
sufficiently widely held and firmly entrenched. These together amount to a theory. Then what the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Boyd (1988), p. 211. 
5 Boyd (1988), p. 211f. 
6 Does this mean that the problems I am discussing here can be easily evaded – that a friend of the views under 
attack can just restrict her views to the specifically moral and thus avoid them? No. First, obviously, if she does 
thus restrict her view, there are significant questions about the normative more generally that she leaves 
unanswered. Second, both the Cornell realists mentioned and neo-descriptivists like Jackson, who I discuss 
next, use their semantics to make cognitivism plausible: the accounts of the semantics is used to make plausible 
that moral sentences are truth-apt. If other central parts of normative language must be left out of the account, 
one has failed to defend cognitivism about the normative more generally. It is fully compatible with what has 
been defended that while there is a fact about what one morally ought to do, it is not a factual matter whether 
one (all things considered) ought to do what one morally ought to do. 
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moral terms refer to are what satisfy the result of replacing the moral terms by variables. Of course, 
for this to work, there will have to be sufficiently substantive beliefs linking the moral to the 
descriptive; and on this view the reference of moral terms is determined by such beliefs. But then 
Alternative should be possible: two communities can have normative terms which play the same 
action-guiding role but which have their reference determined by different folk theories in such a way 
that they are not coextensive. 
An apparent complication is that Jackson speaks of the reference of moral terms as 
determined not by current folk morality but by mature folk morality, which is an idealized version of 
current folk morality. But the complication is ultimately irrelevant. If ‘mature folk morality’ was 
whichever folk morality got the moral facts right, then there couldn’t be two differing folk moralities 
of different communities determining different referents for moral terms. But such a conception of 
mature folk morality would trivialize Jackson’s outlook. ‘Mature folk morality’ is more reasonably 
understood as simply an idealized version of current folk morality: folk morality purged of, for 
example, incoherencies. But then different communities can have different mature folk moralities. 
A third Alternative-friendly theory is that of David Copp (2001). Copp defends what he calls 
“realist-expressivism”, which is a basically realist view coupled with the idea that use of normative 
expressions serves, through a mechanism like conventional implicature, to express an attitude.7 Copp 
further attempts to deal with the question of why the truth-conditional contents of normative 
predicates should be linked to the conventional implicatures associated with these predicates. What he 
says is that to say of ⎞-ing that it is ‘wrong’ is to say that there is a “relevantly justified or 
authoritative” standard that prohibits ⎞-ing. This supposedly explains the implicature, for if someone 
says that according to some justified or authoritative standard, ⎞-ing is prohibited, it is only natural 
that she thereby should somehow convey the attitude that she is in favor of the standard. Copp thinks 
that the property the predicate stands for explains what attitude is expressed. It would be natural     
for someone friendly to all this to further hold that different attitudes are expressed by predicates 
standing for different properties, and that Alternative is ruled out. 
However, Copp’s story seems not to work. Crucial to the story is that what is said is that 
according to some justified or authoritative standard, ⎞-ing is prohibited. If what was said was only that 
according to some standard satisfying some purely descriptive condition ⎞-ing is prohibited, the 
connection between content and implicature would not have been explained. But if Copp means to 
provide an account of normative language more generally, then what he says goes for ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ goes for ‘justified’ too, for ‘justified’ is also an normative expression. So to say of something 
that it is ‘justified’ is to say that it has such and such a property and moreover to express an attitude 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Copp is non-committal as to whether the phenomenon he is concerned with deserves exactly the label 
‘conventional implicature’. See also his (2009) on this. 
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about this. This problematizes Copp’s account of the connection between content and implicature. 
For the truth-conditional content of “⎞-ing is wrong” is then just that there is some F standard that 
prohibits ⎞-ing, where F is the truth-conditional content of ‘justified’.8 
If Copp cannot explain the conventional implicature by appeal to what property the predicate 
stands for, it is natural to suspect that there can, given Copp’s view, be predicates standing for 
different properties such that the use of each serves to express the attitude expressing by, for 
example, the use of ‘right’. But then Copp’s view is Alternative-friendly. Think of it this way. On 
Copp’s view, there are two different aspects to the meaning of a normative predicate: its contribution 
to truth-conditional content, and what it conventionally implicates. If one aspect does not explain the 
other, then these aspects of a normative predicate’s meaning can vary independently of each other. 
For example, the contribution to truth-conditional content can vary while the conventional 
implicature does not. But this is Alternative-friendliness. 
The Alternative-friendly theories discussed are all of the naturalist variety. But Alternative- 
friendliness and naturalism are not the same thing. There is nothing that immediately rules out that 
different communities could use their thinnest normative predicates to pick out different non- 
naturalistic properties. And it could be that an Alternative-unfriendly view allows that the thinnest 
possible normative predicates stand for naturalistic properties. Indeed, Ralph Wedgwood’s 
Alternative-unfriendly view, which I will bring up later, is of this kind. 
So to sum up the main lesson of this section: if Alternative is impossible, that rules out a 
number of diverse potentially attractive theories of how normative language works. Already that is a 
good reason for considering Alternative. But things are a whole lot more interesting if Alternative is 
actually possible. I now turn to explore that alternative. 
 
2. What if Alternative is possible? 
A first thought is that if Alternative is possible, then there is some sort of live issue as to whether we 
or the alternative community get things right. They do what they do based on considerations about what 
is ‘good’ and ‘right’ in their sense; we do what we do based on what is ‘good’ and ‘right’ in our      
sense. Since our normative terms aren’t coextensive, we act differently. But whose normative terms is 
it that, as it were, limn the normative structure of reality? What set of normative terms ought to be 
used when we ask ourselves what to do? It could be ours; it could be theirs. 
This thought would in turn encourage a novel kind of skeptical challenge concerning the 
normative: even if indeed we can come to know what is good and what is right, there would remain the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Copp also uses “authoritative”. This complicates things but does not affect my criticism. Either 
“authoritative” too is an evaluative term and then what is said in the text applies to it too, or it is not evaluative 
but just expresses that a norm is in play without in any sense endorsing it, in which case it does not explain the 
conventional implicature. 
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question of whether it is these notions or the notions of this other possible community that limn the 
normative structure of reality – and how could we figure out the answer to that question? (And is 
there even an objective answer to that question, even if there are objective answers to questions 
about what ‘ought’ to be done in our sense and about what ‘ought’ to be done in their sense?) 
However, this first thought is prima facie problematic, whatever in the end we should say 
about it. For exactly how should we conceive of what is at issue between us and this other 
community? To see the problem here, consider the following simple suggestion: the question 
concerns which actions it really is right to perform, those falling under our ‘right’ or those falling under 
their ‘right’. That would be a silly way to conceive of the supposed question, for – obviously – the right 
actions are the ones that fall under our ‘right’. That is just an instance of the general point that the 
things that are F are the ones that fall under the predicate ‘F’ as I actually use it.9 
Presumably the proposed way of conceiving of what could be at issue between us and the 
alternative community is needlessly crude. But there is a general problem that would appear to afflict 
all statements of what is at issue: in any statement of ours about what is at issue, our normative terms 
are employed, and in such a way that the question as framed threatens to be trivially to be settled in 
favor of our terms, while in any statement of theirs about what is at issue, their normative terms are 
employed and in such a way that the question as framed threatens to be trivially settled in favor of 
their terms. Below I will discuss whether one might get around this problem. But for now, let us 
suppose – what I also think is the case – that the problem cannot be avoided. What then? 
There are two things one might say. One is that there is something at issue between us and 
the other community, along the lines gestured at: it is only that the problems pointed to show that it is 
ineffable what the issue is. Even when it has been determined what falls under our ‘right’, ‘ought’, etc., 
and what falls under their ‘right’, ‘ought’, etc., there is what I will refer to as a further question, even if 
our attempts at stating that supposed question fail, and for principled reasons. While it may be that we 
are right about what ought to be done and they are right about what ought* to be done – where I use 
‘*’ to indicate the alternative ought’ of the other community – either they are wrong in letting their 
actions be guided by considerations about what ought* to be done or we are wrong in letting our 
actions be guided by considerations about what ought to be done.10 I want to discuss the issue in the 
abstract and not tie the discussion to any particular type of hypothesis about the extensions of 
the alternative normative concepts, but for illustrative purposes, suppose a deontological theory is 
true of what ought to be done, but the ‘ought*’ of the other community is consequentialist. Suppose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Setting aside obviously orthogonal complications related to the liar paradox. 
10 Of course not even the most morally conscientious among us are always concerned with what ought to be 
done; and even when we are so concerned, we can be wrong, and even radically so, about what ought to be 
done. And if the members of the alternative community are like us, the same will hold of them, mutatis 
mutandis. In the main text I slide over this, as it doesn’t affect the main points. 
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further that they are about to perform some action – say, sacrifice an innocent child for the greater 
good – that is consequentialistically but not deontologically sanctioned. “Wait”, we say, “you ought 
not to do that!”. “We know”, they reply, “that we ‘ought’ not to do this. But we ought* to do it.” We 
persist: “But what you ought* to do is not what you really ought to do”. They say: “Right again – but 
it is also true that what one ought to do is not what one really ought* to do”. Everything they say in 
reply to us is true; but as the child dies we may still feel that there is something there that they missed. 
What we feel is that there is a further question there, one about which they are tragically mistaken. 
(Of course, if we feel that there is a further question we might also feel the nagging suspicion        
that we are tragically mistaken about it. As we do what we ought to do and don’t maximize 
happiness, we may worry: maybe it is instead we who are tragically mistaken?.... Even if, of course, we 
ought to do what we ought to do.) 
Another thing one might say, eschewing the idea of a further question, is that once it is 
settled what falls under ‘right’, etc., and what falls under their ‘right’, etc., all the questions in the 
vicinity have been settled. There’s what’s “right” in our sense and what’s “right” in their sense, and 
that is that. The idea that there are any further questions there, whether expressible or not, would be 
mistaken. I will not attempt here to decide which reaction would be the most reasonable – although 
needless to say one may be uneasy about the idea of ineffable questions. Instead I will discuss the 
upshot of each suggestion. 
It is fairly obvious what the upshot might be of saying that there is a further question. The 
skepticism mentioned above is then a live issue. Even if we are perfectly successful in figuring out 
what is right, good, etc., there remains the fact that there are other possible words with the same 
normative roles as ours but with different extensions, and maybe we should care instead about what 
falls under those words. (Of course the ineffability issue rears its head as I try to state the upshot. I 
use the ‘should’ of my language when discussing this. But don’t begrudge me a pinch of salt when I 
discuss the idea of embracing the idea of a further question – even if, by the end of the day, this 
route should be rejected.11) And no matter how successful our methodology for figuring out what is 
good, right, etc. may be, what reason is there to think that we are also right in thinking that this is 
what we should care about? (Again, don’t begrudge me a pinch of salt.) 
I think most would find it more reasonable simply to deny that there is an ineffable further 
question. But also such a denial has important, and potentially problematic, consequences. Consider 
again a situation like that of the sacrifice of the innocent child, above. Suppose it is right to ⎞ but 
right* to ⎠ and ⎞-ing and ⎠-ing are incompatible. Suppose further that from our perspective, ⎠-ing in 
this situation would be abhorrent. Surely what we would want to say that they – the others – are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The phrase ‘pinch of salt’ was famously used by Frege, when he saw himself running up against the in 
principle ineffable. See Frege (1892). 
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just mistaken. What one really ought to do in this situation is to ⎞. And of course we can say this latter 
thing; it is not as if, on the option we are now exploring, this is an untrue thing to say. The problem is 
that they can say, with equal justification, what one really ought* to do in this situation is to ⎠. We may care 
more about what one ought to do, but they care more about what one ought* to do. We can say that 
one ought to be concerned with what one ought to do rather than with what one ought* to do, and 
maybe we can say so truly; but they can similarly say that one ought* to be concerned with what one 
ought* to do rather than with one ought to do. And so on. If there is no further question, this is      
all there is to it. 
Let the complacent attitude be that of despite what has just been stressed resting content, when 
deliberating about how to act, with being concerned with what one ought to do, and of not being 
bothered by the fact that there are other things one ought* to do. The friend of the complacent 
attitude can perhaps attempt to defend her stance by saying that discontent with this attitude stems 
from the idea that there is a further question, but once we have abandoned that idea, we can and 
should be content with the complacent attitude. Only if there is a further question can there be an 
ulterior standard against which what I have dubbed the complacent attitude can be measured and 
criticized. But whereas such a response might have been in order if it could be supposed that there 
were only two options – to accept that there is a further question or to adopt a complacent attitude – 
these are not, in the wider scheme of things, the only two options. One other option is to reject 
Alternative-friendly views. And yet another option is to retain an Alternative-friendly view, reject the 
idea of a further question, and instead of adopting what I have called the complacent attitude take the 
questions about what is good and right and what ought to be done to be deflated. If we are inclined   
to feel good about doing what ought to be done rather than what ought* to be done, and to criticize 
them for doing what ought* to be done rather than what ought to be done, we might consider      
that the corresponding reactions on their part can be equally efficiently supported. 
To stress, the difference between the complacent attitude and the deflationary attitude is this. 
The complacent attitude is that of according the same importance to questions about what is good 
and right and what we ought to do as we always have, even given a realization that Alternative is 
possible and that there is no further question. The deflationary attitude is that the importance of these 
questions is, precisely, deflated if Alternative is possible and there is no further question. I submit  
that deflationism seems clearly more reasonable than complacency. Once we have abandoned the  
idea of a further question, what basis can there possibly be for attaching greater objective significance 
to what we ought to do than to what we ought* to do? We can say that it is right and good               
to do one what ought to do; but there is the little devil ready to whisper in one’s ear what surely is 
true: that they can equally comfort themselves with the thought that it is after all right* and good* to 
do what one ought* to do. And – if there is no further question – that is all there is to it. 
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The structure of the foregoing has been somewhat complex. Recapitulation is in order. There 
is a class of theories of the semantics of normative terms on which Alternative is possible; these 
theories are Alternative-friendly. If Alternative is in fact impossible, then of course these theories    
are simply false. If Alternative is possible, then, one may think, there is a further question about which 
normative terms are privileged. I indicated that any such further question would appear to have        
to be ineffable. If there still is a further question like this, difficult questions arise concerning how      
it is to be resolved. If there is no further question, then the issue arises of whether the complacent 
attitude is appropriate, or whether one should instead take the normative issues to be deflated.    
When it comes to this last issue, I have indicated that the latter option is preferable. 
Note how the considerations presented function as an extended argument against the 
theories I have dubbed Alternative-friendly. Suppose you are an Alternative-friendly theorist. If 
Alternative is impossible, you are wrong. So suppose Alternative is possible. Is there then a further 
question of the kind indicated? You might say there is, but then you are committed to the idea of 
ineffable questions. Such ineffability is something many would feel uncomfortable with. In addition, 
even if you can say that sentences about what is good and right and ought to be done are capable of 
objective truth and falsity, that still does not warrant any claim to the effect that the ineffable 
question has an objective answer. Suppose then that you instead reject the idea of a further question. 
Then you are stuck with the deflationary attitude; you’ve ended up deflating the significance of 
questions of what is good and right and what ought to be done. 
My main points have been stated. In the sections to follow, I will fill in some detail and 
respond to some envisaged objections. 
 
3. Expressing the further question 
As earlier indicated, one may think there are ways of expressing what I have called the ‘further’ 
question, so that this supposed further question would not have to be ineffable. 
One possible model is provided by a suggestion that Ted Sider (2009) discusses favorably: 
that debates over aesthetic realism should be recast so they are no longer conceived of as being over 
whether aesthetic sentences have objective truth-values, but over whether some aesthetic predicates 
are the truly ‘natural’ or ‘fundamental’ or ‘joint-carving’ ones.12 Sider’s idea is that the would-be 
aesthetic antirealist fights a losing battle if she insists that aesthetic sentences lack truth-values. 
Instead she should insist that there are no most natural possible aesthetic predicates – different 
counterparts of, say, ‘beautiful’ used in different communities. Correspondingly, the aesthetic realist 
is to be seen as affirming that there are some unique most natural aesthetic predicates. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Sider (2009), p. 401. 
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Notice the similarity between Sider’s proposal concerning aesthetic realism and the themes 
here brought up. In the dispute over aesthetic realism as Sider conceives of it as being conducted, 
both the realist and her opponent agrees that the aesthetic sentences of the different languages have 
objective truth-values: they disagree over whether there is an objective answer to the further question 
of which aesthetic notions carve the world at its joints. Applied to the general issue at hand here: it 
can be agreed on all hands that claims about what ought to be done, what ought* to be done, etc., 
have objective truth-values, but – the idea would be – there is a further question of whether ‘ought’ or 
one of its counterparts carves at the world’s joints, and, if so, which one does so. 
Sider’s idea might be attractive to a friend of the idea of a further question who wants 
nothing to do with absolute ineffability. While attempts at asking the further question which crucially 
make use of normative terms fail, for reasons indicated, we can non-trivially raise the question of 
which normative terms are the most natural or fundamental ones – stand for the most natural or 
fundamental properties – and thus we can ask the further question after all; or that would be the idea. 
The further question between us and the alternative community concerns whose terms stand for the 
most natural or fundamental properties. When we have the sense that they go wrong when using the 
*-terms for evaluation, and that they had better use our terms, what that amounts to is our holding 
that our terms carve at the joints. 
But Sider’s proposal for how to understand the debate over aesthetic realism fails, for the 
reason that some aesthetic predicates may be the truly natural or joint-carving ones while this says 
nothing about their aptness for aesthetic evaluation. The following example should help make the point. 
Consider two different communities with different aesthetic predicates – for example, they may have 
different, non-coextensive predicates ‘tasty’. Suppose further that the tastes of one community are 
such that the extension of ‘tasty’ in their mouths is more metaphysically natural, for example because 
there is one particular chemical such that they like – gustatorily like – food and drink that contains this 
chemical in sufficient quantities, so the referent of their ‘tasty’ is more natural. To take this to be 
relevant to which community objectively has the aesthetically better taste would clearly be 
unwarranted. Correspondingly for other normative disputes, including for example moral disputes, 
even if in other cases it is harder to come up with even prima facie compelling examples of greater 
naturalness. The general lesson is that what is metaphysically better – more ‘natural’ – need not be 
evaluatively or normatively better in the relevant dimension.13 The point generalizes. Any attempt to get 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 There are different conceptions of naturalness; and Sider’s own view on naturalness incorporates elements 
that make the argument just given more difficult to run. But these complications do not at bottom affect 
things. 
First, it is reasonable to insist (as Sider does) that naturalness is not best conceived of as physical 
naturalness. If so, then the greater physical naturalness of one of the ‘tasty’-predicates doesn’t immediately 
entail that this predicate is more natural. But this is incidental to the point of the example. Let metaphysical 
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around the threatening ineffability of the further question by saying that it can be stated in non- 
normative terms founders on the fact that what is stated then just is not the supposed further 
question. 
 
4. Moral Twin Earth 
Let me now turn to the Moral Twin Earth argument of Horgan and Timmons, as earlier promised. 
This argument is a prominent argument brought against the causal theory of reference for moral 
terms, and more recently against neo-descriptivism.14 As it is typically discussed, Horgan and 
Timmons’ argument is, first, that these theories allow that there should be terms of other possible 
languages corresponding to our terms in normative role but differing in extension, and, second, by 
appeal to a thought experiment – the Moral Twin Earth scenario – that this consequence is 
counterintuitive, for intuitively our terms and these possible terms would have the same meaning and 
reference. One might think that what I have done in this article is just to bring up this worry in a 
different form. Let me then compare my argument to that just summarized. 
The first claim in the argument from Horgan and Timmins is exactly what I am noting here. 
But the present challenge is independent of the truth of the second claim. Dialectically, this is 
important. As stressed in David Merli (2002), the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is radically 
underdescribed. It is not explained just how the twin-earthian terms come to refer to the different 
things they refer to, and in the absence of such an explanation one may reasonably suspect that were 
the thought experiment to be more adequately spelled out, our intuitions would not clearly go against 
the causal and neo-descriptivist theories. The considerations presented in section 2, concerning what 
to say if Alternative is possible, illustrate the problems that Alternative-friendly theories face even if 
the second claim of the Moral Twin Earth argument is false. 
Another difference, of course, is that I set my sights on Alternative-friendly theories 
generally. There is a connection between this difference and the one just noted. Since Horgan and 
Timmons rely on its being intuitive that we and the twin-earthians mean the same by the relevant 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   naturalness be anything you like: metaphysical naturalness and aptness for aesthetic 
evaluation can still come apart. 
Second, one can take naturalness to be an all-or-nothing matter rather than a matter of degree. (Again, 
Sider does this.) But this is relevant only insofar as it can be hard to come up with any counterparts of ‘tasty’ that 
promise to be natural on an all-or-nothing conception of naturalness, and such that the argument from the main 
text can be run with those as examples instead. And if the defender of Sider wants to rely crucially on that,     
she faces a different problem: doesn’t the proposed reconceptualization of the debate over aesthetic realism 
then hand the aesthetic antirealist a too easy victory? The reason would be that no referents of aesthetic 
predicates are plausibly natural on an all-or-nothing conception of naturalness, for none is plausibly completely 
natural. 
14 See e.g. Horgan and Timmons (1992) for their argument against causal theories, and their (2009) for the 
argument directed against neo-descriptivism. 
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terms, they must consider the theories they target one by one to verify that this really is intuitive. By 
contrast, the dilemma here focused on can be raised for Alternative-friendly theories wholesale. 
As they make clear, Horgan and Timmons take their inspiration from Hare when giving the 
Moral Twin Earth argument. Hare presents similar thought experiments. What Hare (e.g. 1952, 1997) 
prominently argued was that naturalism in ethics leads to “relativism”. One reason it is relevant to 
bring up this claim of Hare’s is that Hare can be seen as attempting, as I am, to investigate the 
consequences if Horgan and Timmons’ second claim is false. 
I think Hare’s charge of relativism is clearly false on the most straightforward understandings 
of what relativism is. First, relativism can be held to involve the claim that proposition truth is somehow 
relative (to an assessor, or a point of view, or….). Naturalism does not entail that. Nor is there 
anything in Alternative-friendliness that suggests this. (I would myself prefer it if the label ‘relativism’ 
was reserved for a view of this first kind.) Second, another view sometimes called relativist is a view 
on which the semantics of the normative is contextualist – so that, to take a simple case, when I say 
“this is right”, what proposition I express depends on the context, and is something like this is right 
relative to standard S – is sometimes called relativist. But it is hard to see why naturalism would be 
especially likely to suggest this sort of view, whatever in the end its fate. And again, Alternative- 
friendliness does not entail a contextualist semantics. 
Anyway, what Hare was really after is that naturalism yields that different communities can 
have words with the same normative role but with different extensions. (In this connection he also 
makes the further point that this consequence is implausible.) In his (1997), he says, 
 
There are in most languages words which we translate ‘wrong’. These words are….rough 
equivalents to one another. But the cultures that use these words call quite different things 
wrong. In one culture, for example, it may be thought wrong not to fight for one’s country, in 
another more pacific culture it may be thought wrong to fight. The important thing to get hold 
of is that.... the people in these different cultures....may be using the word ‘wrong’, or its 
equivalents, in the same sense. Otherwise they would not be contradicting one another, which 
they clearly are. The people in one culture are saying that fighting is wrong and the people in the 
other are saying that it is not wrong, in the same sense of ‘wrong’, so far as its evaluative meaning 
goes. But if we follow the naturalists, we shall have to say that the senses of the word in the two 
cultures are entirely different. This will have the consequence that they are not contradicting one 
another....If we distinguish the senses by using different subscripts, we can say that one of the 
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cultures thinks fighting is wrong1, but that the other thinks it is not wrong2. But these two 
opinions may be mutually consistent, if the two senses of ‘wrong’ are different.15 
 
Hare describes the consequence as ‘relativism’.16 
One may well quarrel with Hare’s reasoning here. The fact that the two cultures are calling 
different things ‘wrong’ does not immediately entail that they use ‘wrong’ with different senses, on 
any reasonable descriptivist view. (If this is not immediately clear, note that for any descriptive 
predicate ‘F’ two cultures can call different things ‘F’ and yet use ‘F’ with the same sense: all that 
would be going on is that they have different beliefs about what is F.) Charitably, one can interpret 
Hare as, rhetorically, making the point that any naturalist theory will entail that some two cultures 
which intuitively use ‘wrong’ with the same sense are using it with different senses. But there is no 
proper argument for that claim here. 
Even if Hare should be right about what naturalism entails, it is misleading to call the 
entailed claim ‘relativism’. The consequence that I can truly say “⎞-ing is wrong” while an 
interlocutor can truly say “⎞-ing is not wrong” can sound relativist. But if all that is going on is that 
we use ‘wrong’ in different senses, this is no more relativist than the point that a Brit and an 
American can point to the same thing and say “that is chips” and “that is not chips”, respectively, 
and yet each speak the truth. And I think Hare is clearly wrong to think that all versions of 
naturalism need have the consequence in question. A naturalist may in principle accept something 
like Wedgwood’s theory of the metasemantics of normative expressions, which I will present 
below.17 
Part of what is going on is that Hare is making the point made in the Moral Twin Earth 
argument. He clearly thinks that the conclusion that the different communities mean different things 
by ‘wrong’ is false. But when he calls the consequence relativistic another theme is arguably brought in. 
What he says, when elaborating upon the passage quoted, is: 
 
There would be no harm in this if all they were doing were describing the act of fighting…The 
trouble starts when we begin using ‘wrong’ for the purpose for which it actually is used in 
language, namely for condemning acts. [I]t is very natural, since this is actually [the use of ‘wrong’], 
to think that the people in the two cultures are, respectively, condemning and refusing to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Hare (1997), pp. 68ff. In early writings the target of Hare’s criticism was naturalist theories according to 
which normative terms could be exhaustively analyzed in descriptive terms. But in (1997), he explicitly also 
includes Cornell realism of the kind earlier described. However, he does not indicate exactly how the argument 
is supposed to work against Cornell realism. 
16 Hare (1997), p. 65. 
17 Wedgwood himself defends a non-reductive naturalism. See his (2007). 
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condemn the act of fighting. Then they are contradicting each other. But according to the 
naturalist they may both be right in what they say. There is no contradiction. The naturalist 
seems to be led to the conclusion that it is both right for one culture to condemn fighting, and 
right for the other culture not to condemn it. And this is a relativist position.18 
 
As Hare actually states his worry, he misdescribes his opponent’s position. The opponent’s view isn’t 
that it is right for one culture to condemn fighting and right for another not to condemn it. It is 
rather that it is, say, right to condemn fighting and right* not to condemn it. It can be tempting to just 
dismiss Hare as being unfair to his opponent. But there is a real concern underlying what Hare says. 
This concern appears similar to the idea of a deflationary attitude brought up in connection with the 
suggestion that there just is no further question: that the idea that some action can fall under one 
‘wrong’ but not a normative counterpart and that this is all there is to it is incompatible with a non- 
deflationary realism.19 
Toward the end of his (1988), Boyd brings up something like the relativist worry. He worries 
that there may be differences in moral beliefs resulting in differences in the extensions of moral 
expressions. But after having brought up this objection under the heading of ‘relativism’, Boyd says 
that the scenario envisaged 
 
…is nevertheless only in a relatively uninteresting sense non-realistic. The dependence of the 
truth of moral propositions upon moral beliefs envisioned [in the sketch of the relevant type of 
scenario] would be…an ordinary case of causal dependence and not the sort of logical 
dependence required by a constructivist conception of morals analogous to a Kuhnian neo- 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Hare (1997), p. 69. 
19 Brink (2001, p. 166) calls the kind of relativism that would be at issue “semantic relativism” and brings up the 
question of why it would be incompatible with realism. His answer is that in the case we are dealing with, the 
reason our words and those of the Twin Earthlings have different referents has to do with our having different 
beliefs and is not explained by differences in the physical environment alone. This is unconvincing. Why should 
this matter? For example, on some views, like general neo-descriptivist views on language, beliefs generally have 
a reference-fixing role. Does that mean that such theories entail a rampant realism-incompatible relativism?      If 
I hold that different communities of scientists refer to different things by ‘electron’ because the members     of 
these communities have different beliefs associated with the word, am I then committing myself to a realism-
incompatible relativism about electrons? Hardly – all I hold is that they refer to different things by ‘electron’. 
Horgan and Timmons also use the label ‘relativism’, but one must be careful about what they mean by 
it. They distinguish two kinds of ‘relativism’. First, they describe the upshot of the Moral Twin Earth argument 
as chauvinistic conceptual relativism. I find the use of the relativist label unfortunate, but be that as it may. The 
important thing to note is that the relativist charge thus understood is not a separate charge. Second, they note 
that one way for the target of their argument to respond is to say that even if we and the Twin Earthians refer to 
different things by our moral words still the words mean the same. This would be a genuine relativist view, what 
they call ‘standard relativism’. But what they are considering under this heading is clearly an optional move     
for their opponent, and not anything that immediately falls out of Alternative-friendly views. 
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Kantian conception of the dependence of scientific truth on the adoption of theories or 
paradigms. The subject matter of moral inquiry in each of the relevant communities would be 
theory-and-belief-independent in the sense relevant to the dispute between realists and social 
constructionists.20 
 
Boyd is certainly right to distinguish the possibility brought up from traditional antirealism or 
relativism. But even if traditional antirealism or relativism isn’t what is at issue, there remains the 
issue I have described. If the thin terms employed by different communities can have different 
referents, and there is no ‘neutral’ way to settle which vocabulary ought to be used, even in principle, 
then realism does not achieve all one might have hoped it should achieve. 
If there is a real threat to Boyd’s type of theory in the vicinity, it is not relativism but the 
problematic presented here. Specifically, any proponent of an Alternative-friendly theory must either 
embrace the idea of a further question, one which would appear to have to be ineffable, or face up to 
the consequences of denying that there is such a further question. 
My emphasizing that we are not dealing with anything properly called relativism may seem 
like a mere terminological point, and not anything worth belaboring. But here is the reason why 
stressing it is important. Calling the consequence we are concerned with – the possibility of 
Alternative – “relativism” is to attach a label to it which immediately and misleadingly suggests a 
certain compromise with what we naturally regard as realism. I think that the possibility of 
Alternative does present real problems. But it is important to realize that if indeed it does, it does so 
via the somewhat laborious route here presented: via the discussion of the threat of ineffable 
questions and the threat of having to accept a deflationary attitude. 
 
5. Sameness of normative role 
Throughout I have talked of predicates having the same normative role. This may well be a source of 
considerable uneasiness. What is it for two predicates – two non-coextensive predicates, at that – to 
have the same normative role? I find the idea of normative role rather intuitive myself. It is 
characteristic of normative predicates that they are fit to be used in practical deliberation about what 
to do; it is characteristic of such predicates that their application has, so to speak, practical 
consequences in addition to merely theoretical ones. They have normative roles. And I think that it is 
likewise clear that different normative predicates are used differently, as far as such roles are 
concerned. For example, the normative use of ‘thin’ predicates is different from that of the various 
‘thick’ ones, and evaluating morally is different from evaluating aesthetically. Different normative 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Boyd (1988), p. 225f. 
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predicates have different normative roles. But if one can compare normative roles one can also judge 
when two predicates have the same normative role. Even if one cannot state in very informative 
terms what the normative role of a predicate is, one can intelligibly speak of sameness of normative 
role.21 
Suppose, however, that I should not be granted this. Suppose either that the idea of 
sameness of normative role of non-coextensive predicates is not properly intelligible or that the idea 
of the normative role of a predicate is misguided in the first place. Even so the problems I have been 
concerned with here do arise, as follows. 
Consider a number of different linguistic communities, each with its own set of normative 
terms, including its own set of ‘thin’ terms, such that the normative terms of the different 
communities all fail to be coextensive with each other. Suppose further – along the lines of the 
doubts just brought up – that it is at best unclear whether any of these terms used by the different 
communities have the same normative role. It cannot be said that any alternative ‘ought’ 
determinately has the same role as ours does. And suppose lastly that which of these normative terms 
you employ matters for action-guiding purposes: the positive normative terms of one language apply 
to different things from what the positive thin terms of another language apply to. Again the concern 
arises: how should you react, knowing that while you ought to ⎞, you ought* to ⎠, where ought* is 
what is expressed by one of these alternative normative terms? The same puzzles as before arise with 
respect to this question. But then the appeal to sameness of normative role is not essential for the 
problem I have been concerned with to arise. 
 
6. The extent of the divergence 
I have said that some theories of normative semantics are Alternative-friendly: on these theories even 
the thinnest terms can have the same normative role yet differ in extension. But I have left open the 
extent to which they can differ in extension. It may be thought that if the extensions of predicates with 
the same normative role can only differ slightly, then the problems I have discussed are not very 
serious. The normative predicates corresponding to each other in normative role by and large agree 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 What I am talking about under the heading of normative role is what Horgan and Timmons (1992) are talking 
about in different terms when describing their Moral Twin Earth scenario. When describing the case, they     
say, “Moral Twin Earthlings are normally disposed to act in certain ways corresponding to judgments about 
what is ‘good’ and ‘right’; they normally take considerations about what is ‘good’ and ‘right’ to be especially 
important, even of overriding importance in most cases, in deciding what to do, and so on” (p. 188). Horgan 
and Timmons’ characterization is so vague that it does not solve any problems anyone might have with the 
notion of sameness of normative role. But it does illustrate that the idea of such sameness is found in the 
literature. 
Sameness of normative role is also what Hare, from his non-descriptivist perspective, in the passage 
quoted above discusses under the heading of evaluative meaning, and what he alludes to when calling the 
different words which we translate ‘wrong’ “rough equivalents”. 
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with each other in their application, and if some proposed action is in the extension of all the 
counterparts of ‘right’, then we can say that this action is licensed as right in a thoroughly realist and 
non-deflationary way. Maybe there are actions such that they are in the extensions of some but not all 
counterparts of ‘right’, and in some sense there may be no ‘objective’ fact of the matter as to whether 
they really ought to be performed, but so long as these actions are fairly few and far between that 
need not be of great concern. One can then avoid both the idea of a ‘further’, ineffable question and 
the threatening deflationary consequences of denying that there is such a question. The whole 
problematic is, one may think, defused. 
Nothing I have said so far blocks this strategy. But if the proponent of a supposedly 
Alternative-friendly theory attempts this as a way out, she is for all intents and purposes abandoning 
her Alternative-friendly theory. She is emphasizing that ‘right’ and its counterparts divide actions into 
three classes – (i) the class of those actions falling under all of them, (ii) the class of those actions 
falling under some but not all of them, and (iii) the class of those actions falling under none of them 
– and what is more, she accords a certain importance to this tripartite distinction. There is something 
important that distinguishes those actions falling under (i); and the question of which actions falling 
under (i) is privileged over the question of what actions fall under our ‘right’. But if she says this, 
nothing of importance separates her from a theorist who rather says that the extension of ‘right’ is 
completely determined by the predicate’s normative role but allows that the normative role does not 
determine a fully determinate extension. Of course, she says something different about the specific 
semantics of ‘right’ than does this other theorist. She allows that some actions in category (ii) fall 
under ‘right’. But by her own lights, the normatively most important question is not about what 
happens to fall under our ‘right’ but instead about what falls under ‘right’ and each of its normative 
counterparts; what is guaranteed to fall under all these predicates because of the normative roles of 
these predicates. 
This point actually serves to highlight a subtlety I slid over when introducing the problem. 
When introducing Alternative, I stipulated that we were to understand the normative terms at issue in 
the thinnest possible way, and I also stipulated that the normative terms of the alternative community 
are counterparts of our all-things-considered ‘ought’, ‘good’ and ‘right’. This way of presenting   
things presupposes that these normative terms of ours are as thin as normative terms can possibly 
be.22 That is a reasonable presupposition. But it could be false: it could be that all our terms are        
to some extent thick, but perfectly thin terms can in principle be introduced. If indeed there can be   
a discrepancy like this, the issue to focus on is whether there can be non-coextensive counterparts of 
the thinnest possible terms. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 A reminder (compare fn. 1): the relevant terms are context-sensitive. Strictly speaking, I am focusing on a 
class of uses of these terms. 
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One reason why it is hard to adjudicate the question of whether Alternative is indeed 
possible is that it is not simply a matter of deciding whether there can be non-coextensive 
counterparts of our normative terms. Even if that should be so, matters could stand differently with 
the thinnest possible terms. 
 
7. Alternative-unfriendly semantics 
I have talked about potential problems for Alternative-friendly views. But what, one may wonder, 
might an Alternative-unfriendly view be like? One may wonder whether not all views on normative 
semantics are in fact Alternative-friendly, in which case the problem brought up is rather more 
general than here brought out. In response, let me briefly describe one prominent view that promises 
to be Alternative-unfriendly: that of Wedgwood (2001, 2007).23 Wedgwood focuses on a maximally 
‘thin’ predicate meaning roughly ‘ought all things considered to prefer’, whose semantic value is 
conceived of as completely determined by its action-guiding role; its role in practical reasoning. More 
precisely, what Wedgwood proposes is that the predicate is governed by the following basic rule: 
 
Acceptance of ‘B(x, y, me, t)’ commits one to having a preference for doing x over doing y at 
time t.24 
 
The semantic value of this predicate is then, Wedgwood argues, the four-place relation between x, y, 
z, and t (if any) such that “it is correct for z to prefer doing x over doing at t and a mistake for z to 
prefer doing y over doing x at t if, and only if, x, y, z, and t stand in that relation”.25 The preference is 
correct if and only if it is in accordance with the goal of practical reasoning; and it is a substantive 
question if there is such a goal and, if so, what the goal is. The predicate Wedgwood focuses on 
accordingly has its reference determined in an importantly different way from that in which ordinary 
descriptive predicates have their reference determined: Wedgwood focuses on the practical 
commitments incurred by acceptance of sentences where the predicate is the main predicate. 
On Wedgwood’s theory, the reference of the thin predicate ‘B(x, y, me, t)’ is determined by 
normative role. Any predicate with this normative role has the same reference. Wedgwood’s theory is 
not Alternative-friendly. 
The distinction drawn in the previous section, between the question of what our thinnest 
terms are like and what the thinnest possible terms are like, is relevant to the assessment of 
Wedgwood’s theory. One possible concern with a view like Wedgwood’s is that attention to the use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 I will follow Wedgwood’s (2001) presentation, which is somewhat simpler. 
24 Wedgwood (2001), p. 15. 
25 Wedgwood (2001), p. 18. 
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of normative terms and concepts, and our judgments concerning possession of normative concepts, 
shows that none of our concepts is as thin as the concept that Wedgwood describes is.26 Whatever in 
the end should be said about this, it is a natural concern to raise. But when thinking about its 
relevance to the present issue, we must distinguish between two claims that can be made on behalf of 
an Alternative-unfriendly view like Wedgwood’s. One is that it correctly describes some of our 
normative expressions; a second is that it correctly describes some possible evaluative expressions that 
could be used. For many purposes, the first claim will naturally be in the spotlight. But for our 
purposes, the second, weaker, possibility claim is the relevant one. So long as this possibility claim is 
true, the problems for Alternative-friendly views are evaded: when asking which ‘right’ it is that ought 
to be used, ours or that of the alternative community, we can then use a perfectly thin, Wedgwoodian 
‘ought’. 
Wedgwood’s theory certainly faces its own problems. I don’t want to attempt to argue in 
favor of it or any similar theory. But it is the sort of theory that promises to get around all the 
problems here considered. 
 
8. Conclusion 
A quick summary is in order, especially since I have been preoccupied with responses to various sorts 
of objections ever since section 3. Either Alternative is possible or not. If it is not possible, a number 
of theories of the semantics of normative terms, the Alternative-friendly views, are false. If it is 
possible, difficult questions arise concerning what to say about the issue of whether any actual or 
possible terms are in any way objectively normatively privileged. Discussions in the literature of 
whether various naturalist theories lead to antirealism or relativism are better cast as discussions of the 
challenge here posed. These naturalist theories are apparently Alternative-friendly, and given that they 
are, friends of these theories will have to either accept that there is a ‘further’ question (which appears 
to have to be ineffable), or embrace a deflationary attitude. 
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